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For almost a decade, the United States and Europe have
anticipated a clash over the protection of personal information.'
Between the implementation in Europe of comprehensive legal
protections pursuant to the directive on data protection 2 and the
continued reliance on industry self-regulation in the United
States,3 trans-Atlantic privacy policies have been at odds with
each other. The rapid growth in e-commerce is now sparking the
long-anticipated trans-Atlantic privacy clash.
E-commerce highlights the more general societal uncertainty
and debate over fair information practices. Online activity both
generates and requires substantial databases of personal
information.4 Whether transactions are person-to-person,
business-to-consumer, or business-to-business, the global growth
and promise of e-commerce means that large quantities of
personal information will move across national borders in the
context of transaction processing. The digital privacy divide
between Europe and the United States is an important obstacle
that will cause significant conflict for e-commerce participants.
This Article will first look at the context of American ecommerce and the disjuncture between citizens' privacy and
1. See Symposium, Data Protection Law and the European Union's Directive: The
Challengefor the United States, 80 IOWA L. REV. 445 (1995); PETER P. SWIRE & ROBERT
E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS: WORLD DATA FLOWS, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND
THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIVE 2-3 (1998) (noting that the United States and Europe
are on a "collision course" over the adequate protection of privacy).
2. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October
1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and
on the free movement of such data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter Directive 95/46/EC].
3. Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting InternationalData Privacy Rules in
Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1318 (2000) ("The United States... has a marketdominated policy for the protection of personal information and only accords limited
statutory and common law rights to information privacy.").
4. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV.
1609, 1624, 1627, 1629 (1999) (noting the large amount of personal information generated
from Internet use and that this information is shared and commercialized).
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business practices. The Article will then turn to the international
context and explore the adverse impact, on the status quo in the
United States, of European data protection law as harmonized by
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 24 Oct. 1995 on the protection of individuals with
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data5 ("European Directive"). Following this
analysis, the Article will show that the "safe harbor" agreement
between the United States Department of Commerce and the
European Commission-designed to alleviate the threat of
disruption in trans-Atlantic data flows and, in particular, to
mollify concerns for the stability of online data transfers-is only
a weak, seriously flawed solution for e-commerce. In the end,
extra-legal technical measures and contractual mechanisms
might minimize privacy conflicts for e-commerce transactions,
but an international treaty is likely the only sustainable solution
for long-term growth in trans-border commercial interchange.
I.

E-COMMERCE AND U.S. DATA PROTECTION

E-commerce does not raise particularly new data privacy
issues. E-commerce does, however, increase the level of
complexity in dealing with the interests of citizens in the fair
treatment of their personal information and with the commercial
goals of transacting parties. There is also a qualitative change in
the nature of data processing activity for e-commerce. Online
commercial transactions depend on both the, creation and
availability of unprecedented and extensive data about
individuals. At the same time, the boundary lines between
sectors, and between offline and online data, are blurring. Ecommerce, in effect, pushes a dramatic increase in the
importance of data privacy issues for consumers, business, and
society. But, United States policy lags far behind and, despite
greater public attention, remains relatively stagnant with a
culture of data stalking and information trafficking.'
5. Directive 95/461EC, supra note 2.
6. Issuance of Safe Harbor Principles and Transmission to European Commission,
65 Fed. Reg. 45,665, 45,665-686 (July 24, 2000); Commission Decision of 26 July 2000
pursuant to Directive 95/461EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Adequacy of the Protection Provided by the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles and Related
Frequently Asked Questions Issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce, 2000 O.J. (L
215) 7.
7. Privacy and Electronic Communications: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Courts and Intellectual Propertyof the House Comm. on the Judiciary,106th Cong. 52-53
(2000) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Joel R. Reidenberg, Professor of Law and
Director of the Graduate Program, Fordham University School of Law) (noting that data
stalking and information trafficking are normal practices in the United States and "legal
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TransactionalData and Profiles

E-commerce leaves an extensive trail of personal
information. Internet service providers and Web sites log user
interactions for technical and commercial operations.'
Online payment systems record basic details about the
transacting parties and their transactions.9 This information may
be passed along to a variety of participants in the settlement of
those transactions.0 Over time, these data trails create rather
intensive databases of personal information."
The warehousing of transaction information and profiling of
online users has become a key strategy in the business models of
e-commerce companies." Businesses believe they can better
service customers and better target prospects if they analyze
detailed behavioral information. Many of the prominent Internetbased companies such as Amazon, Yahoo, and DoubleClick
started with business models that depended on advertising
revenue." Complex information sharing arrangements among
online commercial Web sites-such as banner ad placement,
cookies, or "phone home" software-that each transfer
clickstream information to third parties become extremely
important to business ventures. The behavioral information
enables sites to categorize users and present them with content
assumed to be of interest. In fact, as the technological
capabilities become more sophisticated, the transfer of personal
information is increasingly buried or hidden from users."
rights... do not respond to abusive data practices").
8. See Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1193, 1199-1200 (1998).
9.
See Reidenberg, supra note 3, at 1320 (noting that electronic payment systems
record data about the transacting parties).
10.
Id. at 1322-23 ("Data may be collected in one location, processed elsewhere, and
stored yet at another site... [and] that multiple intermediaries have access to and may
process data in transit.").
11.
Id. at 1323-24 (discussing the phenomenon of "data creep," which subscribes to
the school of thought that "more is better"-thus, companies are warehousing more
seemingly innocuous and anonymous data to generate both demographic and detailed
individual profiles).
12.
See id. at 1324 ("The ease of collecting and storing personal information coupled
with enhanced capability to use it create tremendous commercial pressures in favor of
unanticipated or secondary uses... [and] generate additional value."); Schwartz, supra
note 4, at 1627 n.114 (asserting the collection of personal information has '"enormous'
financial value... [and is] the new currency of the digital economy.'" (quoting Edward C.
Baig et al., Privacy, Bus. WK,Apr. 5, 1999, at 84)).
13.
See, e.g., Yahoo! Inc., Form 10-Q, at *16 (Sept. 30, 1998) ("successfully achieving
our growth plan depends on . . . the successful sale of web-based advertising by our
internal sales-force."), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1011006/0001047469-98040804.txt.
14. For example, users needed a packet sniffer or personal firewall to discover the phone
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Transaction data and profiles are not limited to the online
world. The blurring of borders between offline activities and
online interactions creates significant information privacy
concerns. DoubleClick and Alexa each sought to merge online
information with the offline data to create more detailed
dossiers of individuals." Both faced lawsuits and public
outrage.16 In fact, the blurring of borders also extends to the
public sector's use of private sector data. The FBI, for example,
uses private databases.17 Most likely, Congress could not, as a
political matter, authorize the FBI to create the same
database. More troubling, during the 2000 Presidential
election thousands of Florida voters were excluded from the
polls because ChoicePoint, a private company working for the
state, inaccurately identified those individuals as convicted
felons who were ineligible to vote. 8
With the collapse of many start-up Internet companies, the
disposition of transaction databases becomes a troubling
problem. 9 Toysmart.com, an online toy store, was the unwitting
pioneer in the conflict between bankruptcy and privacy.2" The
company's database was just another asset for sale in the
liquidation, notwithstanding the privacy commitments made to
users that no personal information would be transferred to third
parties.2 ' More recently, eTour.com ran into the same issue when
the failing company sold its database to AskJeeves."2 Between
home features of Real Network's products and of the Microsoft smart download. See Brad King,
File Tracker May Go Too Far (May 11, 2001) (describing stealth file tracking software), at
http'vww.wired.com/newsfmp3/0,1285,43714,00.html.
15. In re DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy Litig., No. 00 CrV. 0641 NRB, 2001 WL 303744,
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2001).
16. See id. at "1 (stating the plaintiffs' federal and state law claims against
DoubleClick); Amazon Unit Settles Lawsuit (Apr. 27, 2001), at http:ll
www.siliconvalley.com/docs/news/tech/063587.htm.
17. Glenn R. Simpson, Big Brother-in-Law:If the FBI Hopes to Get the Goods on
You, It May Ask Choicepoint, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2001, at Al ("[In the past several
years, the FBI, the Internal Revenue Service and other agencies have started buying
troves of personal data from the private sector.").
18. Gregory Palast, Florida's Flawed 'Voter Cleansing" Program, at
http://www.salon.com/politics/feature/2000/12/04/voter_file/index.html (Dec. 4, 2000).
19. See Walter M. Miller, Jr. & Maureen A. O'Rourke, Bankruptcy Law v. Privacy
Rights: Which Holds the Trump Card? 38 HouS. L. REV. 784-86 (2001) (noting that
bankruptcy trustees may be able to sell transaction data).
20. See FTC Announces Settlement With Bankrupt Web Site, Toysmart.com,
Regarding Alleged Privacy Policy Violations (July 21, 2000), at http://www.ftc.gov/
opaI2000/07/toysmart2.htm.
21. Id.
22. See Andrew Heavens & Stephanie Kirchgaessner, Privacy Fears Over eTour
Deal (May 23, 2001) (discussing the sale of eTour.com's customer database), at
http://news.ft.com/ft/gx.cgi.
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data warehousing, profiling, and bankruptcy asset liquidations,
American consumers perceive that they have lost control over
their personal information. 3 For e-commerce, this belief becomes
an obstacle to the growth of online transactions. 4
B. Data Stalking and Information Trafficking in the United States
Sadly, the protection of personal information is a longstanding problem in the United States. In 1977, after three years
of Congressionally mandated study, the U.S. Privacy Protection
Study Commission, reported back to Congress that "neither law
nor technology now gives an individual the tools he needs to
protect his legitimate interests in the records organizations keep
about him." 5 Today, almost twenty-five years later, the
Commission's conclusion remains equally true despite the
rhetoric of self-regulation, technological mechanisms, and
sectoral rights.
While there has been important progress in online privacy
over the last few years, the state of Americans' data privacy
nevertheless is appalling. Data stalking and information
trafficking have become the norm in the United States. 26 As
technical capabilities advance, commercial pressures enhance the
tracking of citizens. Over the last two years, Americans have
been horrified to learn of Intel's plan to impose a hidden digital
fingerprint for the users of every Pentium III chip, of Microsoft's
equivalent to a digital social security number secretly
emblazoned on files, 8 of DoubleClick's surprise plan to match
offline data with hidden collections of online data, 9 and of
23.
See Business Week/ Harris Poll: A Growing Threat, Business Week, March 20,
2000, at 96 [hereinafter Business Week Poll] (revealing consumer fears of privacy
invasions online).
24.
See, e.g., Exposure in Cyberspace, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2001, at B1 (reporting,
in a Wall Street Journal and Harris Interactive poll, that eighty-one percent of Americans
refrained, at least "rarely," from using a Web site or making an online purchase due to
privacy concerns).
25.
THE REPORT OF THE PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COAIAI'N, PERSONAL PRIVACY
IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY 8 (1977).
26. Hearing,supra note 7, at 52 (statement of Joel R. Reidenberg).
27. See Pentium III Processors: Processor Serial Number Questions & Answers
(describing the Intel processor serial number feature), at http://www.intel.com/support/
processors/pentiumiii/psqa.htm (last visited July 11, 2001).
28. See Junkbusters:Privacy Advisory on Microsoft Hardware IDs (warning that
"[fliles produced by several popular Microsoft applications programs include a fingerprint
or tattoo" that may identify a particular computer), at http://wvv.junkbusters.comI
microsoft.html#history (last visited July 17, 2001).
29.
See Letter from Joel Winston, Acting Assoc. Dir., Div. of Fin. Practices, Fed.
Trade Comm'n, to Christine Varney, Counsel for DoubleClick, Inc. (Jan. 22, 2001)
(discussing the FCC's investigation of DoubleClick's plan to merge offline and online
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RealNetwork's surveillance of music listeners." Despite these
public scandals, even now, a popular version of Microsoft's
Internet Explorer (Version 5.0) comes equipped with default
settings that facilitate hidden surveillance of users, and a still
widely used version of Netscape Communicator (Version 4.72)
reports back to Netscape every time a user reads Messenger
email. The next generation Internet transmission protocol may
even force every device connected to the Internet to have the
equivalent of a national identification number.3 1 In effect, the
tendency in the United States is to develop technology that
increases data collection and decreases the transparency to
citizens of such monitoring.
As a result of increased computing and communications
power, previously unimaginable profiles of citizens are now
readily available on the Internet. For example, Venture Direct, a
New York based company, sells a list of heavy black women who
are offered as targets for self-improvement products.32 Not to be
outdone, Acxiom, a company unknown to the public at large but
holding dossiers on 160 million Americans, boasted of its "new
ethnic system... identifying individuals who may speak their
native language, but do not think in that manner."3 3 Acxiom was
essentially offering a list of ethnic Americans who "speak
foreign," but "think American." Not surprisingly, within weeks of
receiving publicity for this outrageous example at a meeting of
the National Association of Attorneys General in September
1999, Acxiom removed its full data catalog from the company's
Web site.3 4 Now the site merely offers "specialty lists" with a
specific mention of the Hispanic market35 and declines to state
clearly that those on the list can even learn of the existence of
their profile.3
data), at http://wwwv.ftc.gov/os/closings/staff/doubleclick.pdf.
30.
See Brian McWilliams, Real Networks [sic] Hit With PrivacyLawsuit, INTERNET
NEWS, (Nov. 9, 1999) (discussing RealNetworks' practice of uploading information about
their customers' listening habits), at http://www.internetnews.com/streaming-news/
articlel0,,8161_235141,00.html.
31.
See John Markoff, A Plan to Expand Internet Addresses, N.Y. TIMES, May 14,
2001, at C10.
See Venture Direct List (advertising a list of subscribers to BELLE, The
32.
Magazine for Full-Figured Black Women), at http:/vww.venturedirect.com/scripts/
index.php?script&&response&&list4416 (last visited July 12, 2001).
Acxiom Product Catalog, p. 5 (1999) (on file with author).
33.
The author used Acxiom as an illustrative example at the meeting of state
34.
Attorneys General Privacy Task Force in September 1999. Acxiom's general counsel was
also a participant at the meeting.
Acxiom, Infobase Specialty Lists, at http://www.acxiom.com/DisplayMain/
35.
0,1494,USA-en~938-976-0-0,00.html (last visited July 9, 2001).
See Acxiom, Notice, Access, Choice (stating that "Acxiom's policy does not
36.
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These egregious practices in the business community are
just a few examples that offend common decency and represent
invidious stereotyping. Even for companies that try to engage in
fair information practices, the threshold of acceptable conduct
keeps rising. As the public and advocacy groups learn of new
abuses, their expectations for fair treatment increase.
Nevertheless, industry lobbyists like to say that such
abusive practices have not resulted in economic loss to
individuals and that protection of privacy would be costly to
society." Lobbyists report astronomical costs to increase privacy
for personal information, 8 but the methodology used to come up
with many of these cost estimates is staggeringly specious."
Recent studies seem to start with the highest target the study
authors think is politically correct and then seem to figure out
how to get there. For example, one well publicized study "found"
that privacy legislation for Web sites in the United States would
cost between $9 and $36 billion." Curiously, this particular study
calculated the cost by asking a group of consultants how much
they would charge to write software from scratch that would
enable Web sites to provide data subject access. 1 The consultants
were asked to assume the database contained Web site
registration information on 100,000 to 10 million users and that
the Web site already "allow[s] users to review and update their
basic [information]. " " The consultants estimated costs ranging
from $44,000 to $670,000 per site!43 The study then used
$100,000 per Web site to come up with its headline numbers.
Does anyone really believe that off-the-shelf products would not
be developed at a fraction of this cost if data subject access were

allow non-public individual information to be provided directly to a consumer" but
also offering to "provide an individual with a copy of the non-public information" they
maintain for a five dollar fee), at http://www.acxiom.com/DisplayMain/
1,1494,USA-en-745-616-0-0,00.html (last visited July 12, 2001).
37.
See, e.g., ROBERT W. HAHN, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE COSTS OF PROPOSED ONLINE
PRIVACY LEGISLATION 23-24 (May 7, 2001) ("[Closts [of proposed laws to protect privacy]
could be in the billions if not tens of billions of dollars."), at http:/www.actonline.orglpubs/

HahnStudy.pdf.
38.
See, e.g., id; see also ONLINE PRIVACY ALLIANCE, Resources (providing links to
recent studies on the economic impact of increasing the privacy of personal information),
at http:/wwv.privacyalliance.orgfresources/research.shtml (last visited July 11, 2001).
39.
See Robert Gellman, Why the Lack of Privacy Costs Consumers and Why
Business Studies of Privacy Costs are Biasedand Incomplete 20-24, presented at the Ford
Foundation Digital Media Forum (June 2001) (on file with the author).
40.
HAHN, supra note 37, at 23.
41. Id. at 16.
42.
Id.
43.
Id. at 20.
44. Id. at 21.
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required? The study also assumed that small to medium sized
Web sites would hire expensive outside consulting firms rather
than high school computer whizzes to write software from
scratch!4 5 Worse yet, the study ignored any financial losses
attributable to weak privacy protections.4 6 For example, Forrester
Research reports that U.S. consumers spent $12 billion less
online last year as a direct result of inadequate privacy
protection.4"
Even aside from a game of numbers, economic damage
arguments seriously misconstrue the harm to society from the
loss of faith and confidence in the fairness of information
practices. Privacy is about the democratic fabric of society.48 The
very misuse of personal information is a harm to the individual
citizen in democratic society that calls for redress.
Existing legal rights in the United States simply do not
respond to abusive data practices and the need for sanctions
against the misuse of personal information.49 American law is
sporadic, confused, and wholly inadequate to protect citizens in
the face of privacy-invasive technical advances and pervasive
online commercial surveillance. The principal statutes protecting
Americans' privacy in the context of electronic communications
have simply not kept pace with private sector information
processing developments. The Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 1986,"0 the Telecommunications Act of 1996,1 the
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984,52 and the Video
Privacy Protection Act of 1988'3 each contain narrow data privacy
provisions that do not cover the vast array of online activities.54
Indeed, Congress has granted drug abusers greater privacy
HAHN, supra note 37, at 16.
45.
See id. at 21-24 (declaring that online privacy legislation would be costly to the
46.
consumer without accounting for losses attributable to weak privacy protections).
See Paul Davidson, Marketing Gurus Clash on Internet Privacy Rules, USA
47.
TODAY, Apr. 27, 2001, at lB.
48.
See Reidenberg, supra note 3, at 1325 (noting that information privacy is
recognized as a vital element of a civil society by democracies around the world);
Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1653 (arguing that data privacy is necessary for democratic
deliberation and individual self determination).
49.
See PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW: A STUDY
OF UNITED STATES DATA PROTECTION 33-35 (1996) (discussing the limited reach of
constitutional rights in protecting information privacy in the private sector).
50.
18 U.S.C §§ 2510-2522 (1994 & Supp. V 2000).
51.
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
52.
47 U.S.C. § 551 (1994 & Supp. V 2000).
53.
18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1994).
See, e.g., In re DoubleClick, 2001 WL 303744, at *6-13 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
54.
(discussing the difficulty of applying ECPA to online data sharing).
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protection than lawful users of the Internet.5 5 Even the recent
lawsuits filed across the country in several of the more prominent
Internet data scandal cases are forced to rely on deceptive trade
practice theories because basic privacy rights are not clearly
established in either the common law or by statute.5 6
C. Self-Regulation and Technological Mechanisms
to ProtectPrivacy
Despite the rising expectations of the American public for
online privacy, policy decisions continually defer to industry selfregulation and technological mechanisms for fair information
practices." E-commerce proponents are strong advocates of the
self-regulatory philosophy. 8 But the history of industry selfregulation and technological privacy demonstrate that these
mechanisms have not and will not provide effective protection for
citizens without the support of legal rights. 9 The non-regulatory
solutions may have been promoted with the best intentions of
industry and government policy-makers, but the conditions of
market failure are too strong. In the end, self-regulation and
technical tools have proven to be more public relations than
meaningful information privacy for citizens. Indeed, as
technology advances, so do public concerns and expectations for
online privacy protections.
Yet, deeper than the practical experience of self-regulatory
efforts, privacy rights mark the boundary between totalitarian
and democratic governance. Privacy is central to our freedom of
association and our ability to define ourselves in society." These
are basic political rights in a democracy and are fundamental
American values. In contrast to the political nature of privacy,
self-regulation assumes that all privacy values can and should be
resolved by a marketplace. Democratic societies do not, however,
Compare 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-1 to -2 (1994 & Supp. V 2000) (imposing
55.
confidentiality of substance abuser's personal information), with 47 U.S.C. § 222 (Supp. V
2000) (making protections applicable only to service providers).
56. See, e.g., In re DoubleClick, 2001 WL 303744, at '1 (relying on, inter alia, four
state common law claims); McWilliams, supranote 30.
57. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Restoring Americans' Privacy in Electronic Commerce,
14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 771, 774 (1999) ("[U.S. policy on] fair information practices has
historically been predicated on the philosophy that self-regulation will accomplish the
most meaningful protection of privacy without intrusive government interference and
with the greatest flexibility for dynamically developing technologies.").
58. Id. at 775.
59. Id. at 773-81.
United States v. Citizens State Bank, 612 F.2d 1091, 1094 (8th Cir. 1980)
60.
(holding that "maintaining the privacy of one's associations may be necessary to
guarantee freedom of association") (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
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typically sell off the political rights of citizens. Indeed, article 1,
section 1 of the California state constitution was amended by
referendum to include express protection for privacy and to apply
that protection against businesses gathering and using personal
information."i
Reliance on self-regulation is not an appropriate mechanism
to achieve the protection of basic political rights. Self-regulation
in the United States reduces privacy protection to an uncertain
regime of notice and choice.62 As a set of privacy principles, this
approach misses key elements of the package of universally
recognized fair information practice principles such as data
minimization, data access, and storage limitations.63
Selfregulation also enables data collectors to change the rules after
the data has been collected from individuals.
As a practical matter, most Web privacy notices are nothing
more than confusing nonsense for the average American citizen.64
Policies are often found only through obscure links buried at the
bottom of a Web page and are routinely made "subject to change."
Once found, a linguistic analysis of the policies of ten major Web
sites affected by data scandals shows that readers will not be
able to understand the privacy statements without at least a
college education and many could not be understood without a
post-graduate education.65 In fact, privacy policies are practically
impossible to draft at a reading level most Americans can
comprehend. Self-regulation, thus, denies the average American
citizen an opportunity to make informed choices and reserves
privacy for the nation's college educated citizens.
The Web seal programs are not a substitute for clear
independent legal recourse. Seals, at best, offer an incomplete
response to the misuse of personal information. Seal programs
establish inconsistent substantive privacy standards for Web
61. See generally Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994) (relying on the referendum
ballot pamphlet in holding that constitutional protections apply against nongovernmental organizations).
62. See NAT'L TELECOMM. AND INFO. ADMHN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ELEMENTS
OF EFFECTIVE SELF-REGULATION FOR PROTECTION OF PRIVACY (Jan. 1998) (stating that,
for self-regulation to be meaningful, businesses must adhere to substantive rules
regarding notification and choice, rather than articulating broad policies or guidelines in
these areas), at httpJ/wvv.ntia.doc.gov/reports/privacydraft198DFTPRN.htm.
63. See Reidenberg, supra note 3, at 1325-29.
64. These notices parallel the problems faced by consumers in understanding the
myriad of vaguely worded, but lengthy, privacy notices sent by conglomerate financial
institutions pursuant to their Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act obligations. See 15 U.S.C. §§
6801-6803 (Supp. V 2000).
65.
See Will Rodger, Privacy isn't Public Knowledge: Online Policies Spread
Confusion with Legal Jargon, USA TODAY, May 1, 2000, at 3D ("Every policy studied is
written at a college level or higher.").
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sites' use of personal information.6 Programs such as TRUSTe
omit key fair information practice standards from the minimum
requirements of certification such as mandatory access to stored
personal information.6 7 With the rare exception of the
Entertainment Software Rating Board (ESRB), seal programs do
not require, as a condition for certification, that damage remedies
be granted to the victims of information misuse.68 Seal programs
are also unlikely to cover the vast majority of Web sites. The two
major seal programs, BBBOnline and TRUSTe, collectively
certify a miniscule fraction of American Web sites.69 Major sites
such as Amazon.com do not even appear to participate.
Furthermore, seal programs narrowly restrict the scope of
their certifications in ways that defy reasonable expectations of
privacy. For example, TRUSTe only certifies sites with respect to
the information that is "used to identify, contact, or locate a
person."" Yet, Business Week reports that sixty-three percent of
Internet users were uncomfortable with Web sites tracking their
movements even though the sites did not tie the surveillance
data with a user's name or real world identity.' Seal programs
tend to apply only to the collection of data during specific,
narrowly defined interactions such as those with Web sites. As a
result, major data scandals involving TRUSTe licensees-such as
Intel, Microsoft, and RealNetwork-turned out to be outside the
scope of TRUSTe's certification.72
66. Compare,e.g., TRUSTe ProgramPrinciples(requiring only that businesses offer
users opt-out opportunities, encryption of personally identifiable information, and
mechanisms for users to verify the accuracy of their personal information), at
http./www.truste.com/programs/pub-principles.html (last visited July 22, 2001), with
BBBOnline: Privacy Program Eligibility Requirements (including TRUSTe's program
requirements in addition to requirements that the business does not share users' personal
information with outside parties operating under a different privacy notice and that the
business takes reasonable steps to assure that personal information is accurate, complete,
and timely for the purpose for which it is used), at http:/vwivv.bbbonline.org]
privacy/threshold.asp (last visited July 27, 2001).
67. See TRUSTe ProgramPrinciples,supra note 66.
68. See ESRB Privacy Online PrinciplesGuidelines and Definitions, para. 6 ("If the
participating company has not adhered to its privacy practices, consumers must be offered
a remedy for the violations."), at http://www.esrb.org/wpdefinitions.asp (last visited July
10, 2001).
69. See Just Two Months After its One-Year Anniversary, BBBOnline Privacy
ProgramAwards its 500th Seal (May 9, 2000), at http://www.bbb.orgladvertising/alerts/
bbbolseal.asp; TRUSTe Approves 1000th Web Site (Jan. 12, 2000) (reporting on the
1000th seal approved by TRUSTe), at http://www.truste.com/aboutabout_1000th.html.
70.
TRUSTe ProgramPrinciples,supra note 66.
71.
Business Week Poll, supra note 23.
72.
TRUSTe's program only covers data collected by a company's Web site from
users. TRUSTe Program Principles, supra note 66. In the case of Intel, the
microprocessor serial number was a hardware issue, the Microsoft Global Unique
Identifier was a software issue, and the RealNetwork's phone home feature was also
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Just as self-regulation and seal programs are flawed, the
promise of technology does not work by itself. In a society in
which the typical citizen cannot figure out how to program a
VCR, how can we legitimately expect the American public to
understand the privacy implications of dynamic HTML, Web
bugs, cookies, and log files? The commercial models, however, are
predicated on "personalization" and "customization" using these
technologies.
Technologies are not policy neutral.73 Technical decisions
make privacy rules and, more often than not, these rules are
privacy invasive. For technology to provide effective privacy
protection, three conditions must be met: (1) technology
respecting fair information practices must exist; (2) these
technologies must be deployed; and (3) the implementation of
these technologies must have a privacy protecting default
configuration."
The marketplace alone does not rise to meet these three
conditions. One of the most celebrated technologies, P3P, has
been on the drawing board since 1996.' 8 Indeed, pressure from
European legal requirements was instrumental in moving the
standard forward and in affecting substantive privacy provisions.
The standard, however, is still only a proposal. Even if the
standard is finalized this year, P3P will be useless unless
incorporated in Web browsers and widely adopted by Web sites.76
And, even if P3P is incorporated in Web browsers and widely
adopted by Web sites, the default configurations may still be set
a software tool. Hearing,supra note 7, at 52 (statement of Joel R. Reidenberg).
73.

See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 34-35

(1999) (noting that although "cookies" avoid the expense and inconvenience of passwords,
their use is accompanied by the danger that a user's cookie file could be manipulated or
copied to other systems, thus making them appropriate for use by sites, where little is at
stake, but dangerous for granting access to databases securing sensitive information);
Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules
through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 571-72 (1998) (observing that the use of log
files, which Internet browsers use to record the user's Web traffic patterns, can result in
"substantive inalienable rules as a result of architectural decisions" because the recording
protocol establishes a default rule for collecting personal data that a user can not change
unless the architectural standards allow reconfiguration).
74. See Hearing,supra note 7, at 54 (statement of Joel R. Reidenberg).
75. See Fed. Trade Comm'n: Public Workshop on Consumer Privacy on the Global
InformationInfrastructure,official transcript, at 79-90 (June 4, 1996) (statement of Paul
Resnick, Technical Staff, AT&T Infolab) (describing the then newly developed technology,
PICS, the platform on which P3P would be built), available at http'/www.ftc.gov/
bcp/privacy/wkshp96/pw960604.pdf.
76. Microsoft has announced that it will incorporate P3P in the next version of
Explorer. Glenn R. Simpson, The Battle Over Web Privacy, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2001, at
B1. But, Microsoft will, at best, be using an incomplete version of P3P, i.e. a P3P-Lite,
because the final standard has not yet been adopted.
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as a privacy-invasive implementation. Even if the default
configurations are set to afford maximum privacy protection, P3P
offers no means to assure that the practices of Web sites actually
conform to stated standards. To paraphrase Justice Potter
Stewart, "I do not know it when I cannot see it.""
Average citizens are in no position to make judgments about
the impact of these technologies on their privacy. Despite
widespread press reports about "cookies" technology and the
routine deployment of this technology by Web sites to track site
visitors, almost thirty percent of computer users still do not know
about "cookies," and almost forty percent of computer users do
not know how to de-activate them."
In short, self-regulation and technology will not be adequate
to ensure the public's right to privacy. With rising public
expectations
and increasing technical capabilities, the
commercial environment becomes highly unstable. Seemingly
innocuous data processing activity for an e-commerce participant
may easily become the next front page privacy scandal. The
complexity of e-commerce data-flows in a legal void guarantees
continued public concern and conflict.
II. THE EUROPEAN CHALLENGES
Where online services suffer from a volatile environment of
legal uncertainty in the United States, the situation in Europe is
quite different. The European Directive on data protection takes
another approach. The implications of the European legal
approach for e-commerce and the United States are significant.
A.

The EU DataProtectionDirective

The background and underlying philosophy of the
European Directive differs in important ways from that of the
United States." While there is a consensus among democratic
states that information privacy is a critical element of civil
society, the United States has, in recent years, left the

77. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(asserting, in Justice Stewart's famous words about pornography, "I know it when I see
it").
78. Exposure in Cyberspace, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2001, at BI (reporting the results
of a Wall Street Journal and Harris Interactive online survey).
79. See generally Reidenberg, supra note 3 (noting that, while Europe has a strong
history of privacy legislation embodying first principles, the United States-despite its
adoption ofvarious privacy laws-has historically relied primarily on self-restraint for the
implementation of data privacy standards).
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protection of privacy to markets rather than law." In contrast,
Europe treats privacy as a political imperative anchored in
fundamental human rights.8 European democracies approach
information privacy from the perspective of social protection.
In European democracies, public liberty derives from the
community of individuals, and law is the fundamental basis to
pursue norms of social and citizen protection." This vision of
governance generally regards the state as the necessary player
to frame the social community in which individuals develop
and in which information practices must serve individual
identity. Citizen autonomy, in this view, effectively depends on
a backdrop of legal rights. Law thus enshrines prophylactic
protection through comprehensive rights and responsibilities.
Indeed, citizens trust government more than the private sector
with personal information."
In this context, European democracies approach data
protection as an element of public law. Since the 1970s,
European countries have enacted comprehensive data privacy
statutes.84 Under the European approach, cross-sectoral
legislation guarantees a broad set of rights to ensure the fair
treatment of personal information and the protection of citizens.
In general, European data protection laws define each citizen's
basic legal right to "information self-determination."85 This
European premise of self-determination puts the citizen in
control of the collection and use of personal information. The
approach imposes responsibilities on data processors in
connection with the acquisition, storage, use, and disclosure of
personal information and, at the same time, accords citizens the
right to consent to the processing of their personal information
and the right to access stored personal data and have errors
corrected.88 Rather than accord pre-eminence to business
interests, the European approach seeks to strike a balance and
provide for a high level of protection for citizens.
As data protection laws proliferated across Europe during
the 1980s, there were significant divergences among those laws,
and harmonization became an important goal for Europe. In
80. Id. at 1331.
81. Id. at 1347.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1328.
85.
Id. at 1326.
86. Id. at 1326-27 (listing Professor Colin Bennett's distillation of the First
Principles of information privacy).
87.
See JOEL R. REIDENERG & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, DATA PROTECTION LAW AND
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1995, following the Maastricht Treaty of the European Union,
the European Union adopted the European Directive8 8 to
harmonize the existing national laws within the European
Union.89 The European Directive sought to ensure that all
Member States provided satisfactory privacy protection, and to
ensure the free flow of personal information across Europe
90
through the respect of basic, standardized protections.
Under European Union law, a "directive" creates an
obligation on each Member State to enact national legislation
implementing standards that conform to those defined in the
directive.9 1 The European Directive requires that national law
protect all information about an identified or identifiable
individual whether or not the data is publicly available.9" The
European Directive also requires an individual's consent prior to
processing personal information for purposes other than those
contemplated by the original data collection. The European
Directive allows Member States to further restrict the processing
of defined "sensitive" data-such as health information. " The
European Directive restricts the collection and use of personal
information not relevant for the stated purpose of processing."
The processing of personal information must be transparent with
notice provided to individuals for the treatment of their personal
information.9 6 Organizations processing personal information
must provide the data subjects with access to their personal
information and must correct errors.97 The European Directive
ONLINE SERVICES: REGULATORY RESPONSES 125 (1998) (discussing divergences in
Member State law related specifically to online services).
88. Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 2.
89. Reidenberg, supra note 3, at 1329 ("Europe's goal is to harmonize fair
information practices at a high level of protection.").
90. See Spiros Simitis, From the Market to the Polis: The EU Directive on the
Protection of Personal Data, 80 IOWA L. REV. 445, 446-52 (1995) (chronicling the
Commission's desire to establish a regulatory scheme that would harmonize the already
existing national laws adopted by the Member States).
91. Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 249, available at
http'//europa.eu.intleur-lexen/treaties/datec-consLtreaty en.pdf (last visited Sept. 14,
2001).
92. Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 2, at arts. 2(a), 3, 4.
93. Id. at arts. 7(a), 14(b).
94. Id. at art. 8.For insightful discussions of the flaws in consent as a model of
privacy protection, see the series of articles written by Paul Schwartz: Beyond Lessig's
Code for Internet Privacy: Cyberspace Filters, Privacy-Control, and Fair Information
Practices,2000 WiS. L. REV. 743, 783-85 (2000); Internet Privacy and the State, 33 CONN.
L. REV. 815, 821-23 (2000); and Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV.
1609, 1660 (1999).
95. Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 2, at art. 6(1)(c).
96. Id. at art. 10.
97. Id. at art. 12.
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further requires that organizations maintain appropriate
security for the processing of personal information.
For global information networks and electronic commerce,
the comprehensive approach inevitably invokes some tension.
Without the statutory authority to restrict transborder data
flows, the balance of citizens' rights in Europe could easily be
compromised by the circumvention of Europe for processing
activities. Consequently, the European Directive includes two
provisions to ensure that personal information of European
origin will be governed by European standards. First, a choice of
law clause in the European Directive assures that the standards
of the local state apply to activities within its jurisdiction."
Second, a transborder data flow provision prohibits the transfer
of personal information to countries that do not have "adequate"
privacy protection.99
In terms of enforcement, each Member State must maintain an
independent, national supervisory authority for oversight and
enforcement of these privacy protections.' 0 Significantly, the
European Directive also mandates that Member State law require
any person processing personal information to notify the national
supervisory authority, which is required to keep a public register of
data processors."'
The European Directive provided a transition period, ending
in October 1998, for Member States to transpose these standards
0 2 However, as is not uncommon in the
into national law."
European system, nine Member States failed to comply strictly
with the deadline.1"' By January 2000, the European Commission
began proceedings before the European Court of Justice against
France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands for
their delays in transposition." Although each of these countries
had strong, existing data protection statutes, the European
Commission argued that not all of the standards contained in the
European Directive were satisfactorily addressed in their
national laws. At present, proceedings before the European Court
of Justice continue against France, Germany, and Luxembourg.

98.
Id. at art. 4.
99.
Id. at art. 25.
100.
Id. art. 28(1).
101.
Id. at arts. 18-19.
102.
Id. at art. 31(1).
103.
Id.
104.
Data Protection: Commission Takes Five Member States to Court, at
http//europa.eu.int/comminternal-market/en/media/dataprotnews/2k-10.htm (Jan. 11,

2000).
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Notwithstanding
the
transposition
delays,
the
harmonization achieved by the European Directive is significant,
but does not remove all divergences among, and ambiguities in,
European national laws.' By and large, the European Directive
creates a strong baseline of protection across Europe. But small
divergences and ambiguities will inevitably exist where the
principles must be interpreted by different supervisory agencies
in each of the Member States. These remaining divergences in
standards can pose significant obstacles for the complex
information processing arrangements that are typical in
electronic commerce. For example, the European Directive
requires that privacy rights attach to information about any
"identifiable person."" 6 Yet, the scope of this definition is not the
same across the Member States; what some Member States
consider "identifiable" others do not.0 7 Similarly, the disclosures
that must be made to individuals prior to data collection may still
vary within Europe.0 8 These differences can distort the ability
and desirability of performing processing operations in various
Member States because potentially conflicting requirements
might apply to cross-border processing of personal information.
The effect of this challenge to comprehensive standards is,
however, mitigated by consensus building options and extra-legal
policy instruments that are available within the European
system. The European Directive creates a "Working Party" of the
Member States' national supervisory authorities."'9 The Working
Party offers a formal channel for data protection officials to
consult each other and to reach consensus on critical interpretive
questions.
Compliance with the national laws has also been an issue in
Europe. The notice and registration requirements, in particular,
appear to have a spotty reception. One study conducted for the
European Commission questioned whether data processors were
adequately notifying their treatment of personal information to
the national supervisory authorities, 0 and a recent study by
Consumers International found that European Web sites were
not routinely informing Web users of their use of personal
105.
For an analysis of these divergences, see REIDENBERG & SCHWARTZ, supra note
88, at 125.
106.
Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 2, at art. 2(a).
107. See REIDENBERG & SCHWARTZ, supra note 87, at 124-26.
108.
Id. at 133-34.
109.
Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 2, at art. 29.
110.
Existing Case-law on Compliance with Data Protection Laws and Principles in
the Member States of the European Union, Annex to the Annual Report 1998 of the
Working Party Established by Article 29 of Directive 95/46/EC (Douwe Korffed., 1998).
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information."' Nonetheless, the existence of national laws and
penalties does allow for enforcement actions in these cases of
non-compliance.
B. Implicationsfor the United States
The European Directive exerts significant pressure on U.S.
information rights, practices, and policies. The Directive
facilitates a single information market place within Europe
through a harmonized set of rules, but also forces scrutiny of U.S.
data privacy. In this context, the lack of legal protection for
privacy in the United States threatens the flow of personal
information from Europe to the United States. While business
practices may offer privacy, and self-regulation may yield
protections for personal information, the sheer complexity and
confusion among such mechanisms becomes a handicap for data
flows to the United States. At the same time, the European
Directive is both having an important influence on privacy
protection around the world and leaving Americans with legal
protections as second class citizens in the global marketplace."
Despite
implementation
divergences,
the
overall
harmonization effect of the European Directive creates a common
set of rules for the information market place in Europe.
Companies operating within the European Union have the
benefit of common standards across the Member States rather
than fifteen diverse sets of conflicting national rules. This creates
a large, level playing field for the treatment of personal
information in Europe. With a high level of legal protection
available on a cross-sectoral basis, Europeans do not face the
same privacy obstacles for e-commerce that currently threaten
the American experience. The culture of legal protection in
Europe provides European companies with a competitive privacy
advantage-when doing business in Europe-over the many
American companies that are unaccustomed to applying fair
information practices to personal information.
The European Directive also requires the national
supervisory authority in each of the Member States and the
European Commission to make comparisons between European
111.
CONSUMERS INTERNATIONAL, Privacy@Net:An InternationalComparative Study
of ConsumerPrivacy on the Internet 24 (Jan. 2001) ("Only a third (32.5%) of the sites that
collected personal information and had a privacy policy bothered to alert the visitor to the
privacy policy at the point where that information was collected.").
112.
Countries from Asia to Latin America have followed the European
comprehensive legal approach more closely than the American self-regulatory philosophy
including Australia, Argentina, Canada, Hungary, and New Zealand. Refer to note 120
infra and accompanying text.

HeinOnline -- 38 Hous. L. Rev. 735 2001-2002

736

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[38:717

data protection principles and foreign standards of fair
information practice."' The European Directive further requires
that foreign standards of fair information practice be "adequate"
in order to permit transfers of personal information to the foreign
destination.'14
For the United States, this means that both the national
supervisory authorities and the European Commission must
assess the level of protection offered in the United States to data
of European origin. Because the United States lacks directly
comparable, comprehensive data protection legislation, the
assessment of "adequacy" is necessarily complex.' The European
Commission and the national supervisory authorities recognize
that the context of information processing must be considered to
make any determination of "adequacy." 6
Under the European Directive, the national data protection
supervisory authorities and the European Commission must
report to each other the non-European countries that do not
provide adequate protection."' This bifurcated assessment of
foreign standards means that intra-European politics can play a
significant role in the evaluation of U.S. data practices. While a
European level decision is supposed to apply in each Member
State, the national supervisory authorities are independent
agencies and will still have a degree of interpretive power over
any individual case.
The end result for the United States, and for American
companies, is that U.S. corporate information practices are under
scrutiny in Europe and under threat of disruption when fair
information processing standards are not applied to protect
European data. Some commentators have predicted that any
European export prohibition might spark a trade war that
Europe could lose before the new World Trade Organization
113.
Directive 95/46/EC, supranote 2, art. 25.
114. Id.
115.
See First Orientations on Transfers of Personal Data to Third CountriesPossible Ways Forward in Assessing Adequacy: Discussion Document of the Working
Party on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data, DG
XV COM(97) D 5020 final, at para. 2 (June 26, 1997) (suggesting several criteria that
should be met to meet the minimum standard of "adequacy" and noting the difficulties in
applying standards to the United States and other countries without data protection
legislation), available at http:/europa.eu.int/comm/internal-market/en/media/dataprot/
wpdocshvp4en.htm; Preparation of a Methodology for Evaluating the Adequacy of the
Level of Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data, Annex
to the Annual Report 1998 of the Working Party Established Under Article 29 of the
Directive
95/46/EC,
DG
XV
COM(98)
D
5047,
available at
http'/!
www.droit.fumdp.ac.b/crid/privacy/Tbdf/Chapitrelpdf.
116.
Id.
117.
Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 2, at art. 25(3).
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(WTO)." 's While such a situation is possible in theory, an adverse
WTO ruling is unlikely."'
Even with the difficulties of the European approach,
countries elsewhere are looking at the European Directive as the
basic model for information privacy, and significant legislative
movements toward European-style data protection exist in
Canada, South America, and Eastern Europe. 2 ' This movement
can be attributed partly to pressure from Europe and scrutiny of
foreign privacy rights. But the movement is also due, in part, to
the conceptual appeal of a comprehensive set of data protection
standards in an increasingly interconnected environment of
offline and online data. In effect, Europe, through the European
Directive, has displaced the role that the United States held
since the famous Warren and Brandeis article121 in setting the
global privacy agenda.
With the European Directive's imposition of both
harmonized European legal requirements for the fair treatment
of personal information and limitations on transborder data flows
outside of Europe, U.S. companies recognize that they will have
to respect European legal mandates.12 2 Unless American
companies doing business in Europe choose to flout European
law, U.S. e-commerce businesses must provide stringent privacy

118. See, e.g., SWIRE & LrTAN, supra note 1, at 188-96.
119. See, e.g., Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection:The Impact of
EU and InternationalRules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards,25 YALE J.
INT'L L. 1, 49-51 (2000) (explaining that the WTO would be very unlikely to rule for the
United States in an action for the following reasons: (1) the EU Directive is facially
applicable equally to all countries and companies; (2) the EU has a legitimate policy
objective; and (3) prudential concerns).
120. See, e.g., Council of Europe, Chart of Signatories and Ratifications ETS 108 (listing
countries that have ratified the treaty on data privacy), at http://conventions.coe.int/ Treaty/EN
(last visited July 10, 2000); INDUSTRY CANADA, THE INTERNATIONAL EVOLUTION OF DATA
PROTECTION (justifying the Canadian proposal for a comprehensive privacy law by reference to
the European initiative), at http'//e-com.ic.gc.ca/englislbfastfacts/43dlO.htm (last modified Dec.
10, 2000); OFFICE OF THE PRIVACY COM IISSIONER FOR PERSONAL DATA, HONG KONG,
PERSONAL DATA (PRIVACY) ORDINANCE, ch. 486 (showing that the Hong Kong statute follows
model),
httpAvwwv.pco.org.hk/english/ordinanceordfull.html;
comprehensive
European
HUNGARIAN REPUBLIC, THE FIRSr THREE YEARS OF THE PARLIAMENTARY COMMISSIONER FOR
DATA PROTECTION AND FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 68-72 (1998) (discussing the influence of
the European Directive for Hungarian data protection law); Pablo Palazzi, Data Protection
Materials in Latin American Countries (detailing the emergence of data protection legislation
in Latin America), at httplAvwwv.ulpiano.com/DataProtection-LA-links.htm (last modified Nov.
12, 2000).
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
121.
193 (1890).
122. See Shaffer, supra note 119, at 72-73 ("The timing of the multiple [privacy
protection] efforts [by U.S. companies] in conjunction with the EU Directives coming in
force in October 1998 is no coincidence.").
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protections to data of European origin when processing that data
in Europe or in the United States.
Concurrently, American law and practice allows those same
companies to provide far less protection, if any, to data about
American citizens. This is a particularly troubling aspect of U.S.
opposition to the European Directive's standards. American
companies will either provide Europeans with better protection
than they provide to Americans, or they will treat Americans in
accordance with the higher foreign standards and disadvantage
those citizens doing business with local U.S. companies.
In effect, the proliferation of European-style data protection
measures around the world increasingly means that American
citizens will be left with second class privacy in the United States
while being afforded greater privacy protection against American
companies outside U.S. borders.
III. UNSAFE HARBORS
In response to the risk that Europe would block data flows to
the United States and to great pressure from online industries,
the U.S. Department of Commerce entered into negotiations with
the European Commission to create a "safe harbor" agreement
that would assure Europe of the adequacy of protection for data
processed by U.S. businesses.'23 In the absence of statutory
protection in the United States, the concept was that the
European Commission would endorse a voluntary code of conduct
that would meet the "adequacy" standard."' American businesses
could then publicly commit to adhere to this code for the
treatment of European origin data and be assured of
uninterrupted data flows from Europe.
The lengthy and troubled negotiations on the code began in
1998 between the U.S. Department of Commerce and the
European Commission." Toward the end of the negotiations,
some of the particularly difficult issues were: (1) the existence of
a public commitment for companies adhering to the code; (2) the
access rights; and (3) enforcement in the United States." 6 A final
123. See Letter from David L. Aaron, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, to Industry
Representatives (Nov. 4, 1998), at http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/ ecom/aaronl14.html.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See Letter from Robert S. LaRussa, Acting Under Secretary for Int'l Trade
Admin., U.S. Dep't of Commerce, to John Mogg, Director, DG Internal Market, European
Commission, (July 21, 2000) [hereinafter LaRussa Letter] (addressing final concerns of
the European Commission with negotiations over a voluntary "safe harbor" and offering
compromise by establishing a public list of companies that choose to adhere to the
principles, agreeing that future U.S. data privacy legislation should apply to foreign
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set of documents-including an exchange of letters, the Safe
Harbor Privacy Principles, Frequently Asked Questions setting
out interpretative understandings of the principles, and various
annexes and representations made to the European Commission
by the U.S. Department of Commerce and the Federal Trade
Commission (collectively the "Safe Harbor")-was released in
July 20002' and approved by the European Commission.'
While the approval was an important short-term political
victory for both the United States and the European Commission,
the Safe Harbor agreement is unworkable for both sides and will
not alleviate the issues of weak American privacy protection.
Indeed, choice of law issues may make Safe Harbor irrelevant for
many e-commerce activities.
A. The Adoption of the "Safe Harbor"
1. The Political Dimension. For the European side, the
United States posed a major problem. American law did not
provide comparable protections to European standards, and fair
information practices in the United States were rather spotty. 29'
Yet, European regulators did not want to cause a disruption in
international data flows. 3 ' The prospect of change in U.S. law
seemed remote, and the European Commission would have
serious political difficulty insisting on an enforcement action
against data processing in the United States prior to the full
implementation of the European Directive within the European
Union. Similarly, while transposition remained incomplete, an
aggressive enforcement strategy by a national supervisory
authority could have hampered the national legislative debates
on transposition. Safe Harbor offered a mechanism to delay
facing tough decisions about international privacy and, in the
meantime, hopefully advance U.S. privacy protections for
European data.
On the U.S. side, the Department of Commerce faced strong
pressure from the American business community to block the
transfers, and assuring the Commission that the agreement would do nothing to change
jurisdiction), at http:www.export.gov/safeharbor/USLETTERFINALI.htm.
127.
Issuance of Safe Harbor Principles and Transmission to European Commission,
65 Fed. Reg. 45,665, 45,665-686 (Dep't Commerce, July 24, 2000) [hereinafter Safe
Harbor].
128.
Commission Decision, 2000/520/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 7.
129. Refer to Part I supra.
130.
See Shaffer, supra note 119, at 44-45 (noting the reluctance of EU officials to
enforce the Directive's provisions during negotiations with the U.S. due to pressures from
European businesses and the fact that the majority of the EU countries had not met the
deadline for passing data privacy legislation).
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European Directive. 3 ' The United States was not prepared to
respond to the Directive with new privacy rights and wanted to
prevent interruptions in transborder data flows.132 Safe Harbor
became a mechanism to avoid a showdown judgment on the
status of American law and defer action against any American
companies.
As such, the acceptance in July 2000 of Safe Harbor by the
European Union was a transitory political success. At the
national level in Europe, however, data protection agencies have
expressed substantial opposition to Safe Harbor, and they will
still have
considerable latitude in dealing with the United
133
States.
2. The Dubious Legality of Safe Harbor. In the United
States, however, Safe Harbor faces a serious jurisdictional
obstacle to its enforcement-one of the key European criteria for
acceptance. The U.S. Department of Commerce issued Safe
Harbor documents "to foster, promote, and develop international
commerce." 134 The agreement is predicated on the enforcement
powers of the Federal Trade Commission under section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act. 135 Indeed, as part of the
negotiations, the Federal Trade Commission represented to the
European Commission that it would "give priority to referrals of
non-compliance with safe harbor principles from EU member
states.""' 6 Yet, the underlying legal authority of the FTC to
enforce Safe Harbor is questionable.
As originally enacted by the Federal Trade Commission Act
in 1914, section 5 applied only to unfair methods of
competition." ' Jurisdiction over "unfair or deceptive acts or
practices" was extended to the FTC by the Wheeler-Lea Act of
131.
Id. at 70-72.
132.
See id. at 22-39 (explaining the historic and cultural preference for selfregulation over legislation to ensure data privacy in the United States and noting the
enormous market pressure exerted by a threat to impede data European data flow).
133.
See, e.g., On the Level of Protection Provided by the "Safe Harbor
Principles": Opinion of the Working Party on the Protection of Individuals With
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data, DG XV CA07 COM (00)434 final,
[hereinafter Opinion of the Working Party] (objecting to the ambiguity of Safe
Harbor, questioning the propriety of relying on the limited jurisdiction of the FTC to
enforce the principles, and noting exceptions enumerated by Safe Harbor beyond the
scope
allowed
by
the
European
Directive),
http://europa.eu.int/comm/
internal-market/enmedia/dataprot/wpdocs/wp32en.htm.
134.
LaRussa Letter, supranote 126.
135.
15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1994).
136.
Letter from Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, to John Mogg, Director, DG
XV, European Conm'n (July 14, 2000), http./Avww.exportgov/safeharbor/FTCLETIERFNAL.htm.
137.
Fed. Trade Comm'n Act of 1914, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 719, 719 (1938).
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1938." The stated Congressional purpose was to enable the FTC
to "restrain unfair and deceptive acts and practices which deceive
and defraud the public generally."139 Indeed, contrary to the
purpose of Safe Harbor protecting U.S. business interests in
international trade, the Wheeler-Lea Act amendments sought to
protect the general public from unscrupulous business practices.
In fact, at the time of the enactment of section 5, the FTC's
jurisdiction expressly excluded foreign commerce, not to mention
the protection of foreign consumers as envisioned by Safe
Harbor. " '
While the McGuire Resale Price Maintenance Act of 1952141
expanded FTC jurisdiction into foreign commerce with respect to
monopolistic pricing, the U.S. Supreme Court had specifically
held that only Congressional amendments could expand the
scope of the FTC's authority under section 5.142 In FTC v. Bunte
Brothers, the Commission unsuccessfully sought an expansion of
its interstate commerce authority in the context of antitrust
enforcement.'
Congress eventually responded with the
Magnuson-Moss
Warranty-Federal
Trade
Commission
Improvement Act of 1975'4 that was, according to the Senate
Conference Report, designed "to improve its [the FTC's]
consumer protection activities." 4 5 The 1975 amendments
extended the jurisdiction to acts and practices "in or affecting
commerce," but at no time contemplated protecting American
business interests or foreign consumers.'4 6
Hence, the assertion by the U.S. Department of Commerce
and the FTC that Safe Harbor comes within the section 5
jurisdiction is a radical departure from the stated legislative
purposes of the statute and in direct opposition to the Supreme
Court's restrictive interpretation of section 5 authority.
Within Europe, the legality of Safe Harbor is also open to
question. Under the European Directive, "adequacy" must be
138.
Fed. Trade Comm'n Act Amendments (Wheeler-Lea Act) of 1938, 49, sec. 3,
§5(a), 52 Stat. 111 (1938).
139.
S. REP. CONF. No. 221-1077 (1937).
140.
15 U.S.C. § 45(a).
141.
Fed. Trade Comm'n Act Amendments (McGuire Resale Price Maintenance Act)
of 1952, ch. 745, 66 Stat. 631, 632 (1952).
142.
FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349, 352-55 (1941) (holding that section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act did not give the FTC the authority to reach local
commerce that affected interstate commerce without clear congressional authority).
143. Id. at 353-55.
144.
Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of
1975, Pub. L. 93-637, § 201, 88 Stat. 2183, 2193 (1975).
145.
S. CONF. REP. No. 93-1408, at 1 (1974).
146.
Pub. L. 93-637 § 201, 88 Stat. at 2193.
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assessed in light of the prevailing "rules of law, both general and
sectoral, in force in the third country in question and the
professional rules and security measures which are complied
with in that country."147 However, Safe Harbor was not yet in
existence at the time of the approval by the European
Commission. The European Parliament specifically noted this
problem shortly before the approval by the European
Commission." Similarly, according to the European Directive,
the European Commission only has authority to enter into
negotiations to remedy the absence of "adequate" protection after
a formal finding that the non-European country fails to provide
"adequate" protection.'
Yet, in the context of Safe Harbor
negotiations, the European Commission never made a formal
finding. 5 ' These would appear to be significant administrative
law defects. Although the European Commission maintains that
the European Parliament did not say that the Commission acted
outside its powers, and the Member States voted unanimously in
the political committee to accept Safe Harbor, 5 ' this
administrative process problem remains an open question that
only the European Court of Justice can resolve and gives the
independent national supervisory authorities grounds to vitiate
Safe Harbor through strict interpretations of the European
Commission's ruling.
In addition, the European Parliament pointed out:
[T]he risk that the exchange of letters between the
Commission and the US Department of Commerce on the
implementation of the 'safe harbour' principles could be
interpreted by the European and/or United States judicial
authorities as having the substance of an international
agreement adopted in breach of Article 300 of the Treaty
establishing the European Community and the requirement
to seek Parliament's assent (Judgment of the Court of
Justice of 9 August 1994: French Republic v. the
Commission-Agreement between the Commission and the
United States regarding the application of their competition
laws (Case C-327/91)).152
147.
Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 2, at art. 25(2).
148.
EuR. PARL. Doc. (R5 305) 2 (2000).
149.
Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 2, at art. 25(5).
150.
The procedure for a formal finding is established in Directive 95/46/EC, supra
note 2, at art. 25(4).
151.
See Press Release, European Commission, Frits Bolkestein Tells Parliament
Committee He Intends To Formally Approve "Safe Harbor" Arrangement With United
States On Data Protection (July 13, 2000), at http'//europa.eu.int/comm/internaLmarkett
en/media/ dataprotlnews/harbor5.htm.
152.
EUR. PARL. Doc. (R5 305) 3 (2000).
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B. The Limited Applicability and IncreasedRisks
Notwithstanding its validity in either legal system, the scope
of Safe Harbor provision is very narrow. First, Safe Harbor by its
terms can only apply to activities and U.S. organizations that fall
within the regulatory jurisdiction of the FTC and the U.S.
Department of Transportation." 3 As a result, many companies
and sectors will be ineligible for Safe Harbor, including
particularly the banking, telecommunications, and employment
sectors that are expressly excluded from the FTC's jurisdiction."'
Second, Safe Harbor will not apply to most organizations
collecting data directly in Europe. Article 4 of the European
Directive provides that, if a data controller is located outside of
the European Union but uses equipment within the European
Union, the law of the place where the equipment is located will
be applicable."' This provision establishes a choice of law rule
that greatly reduces the availability of Safe Harbor to
international business. This provision of the Directive is
especially significant in the context of Web-based businesses
because interactive computing means that a European user will
always make use of computing resources at the user's location.
The courts of Member States, such as France, have shown in
other areas a clear willingness to apply the substantive law of
the place where an Internet user is located." Hence, many cases,
and particularly in the context of e-commerce, apply the
substantive law of a Member State rather than Safe Harbor. The
national data protection authorities have also endorsed this
interpretation of the European Directive.'57
By implication, Safe Harbor also raises the risks for data
transfers by companies that do not subscribe to the code. The
approval by the European Commission of Safe Harbor as an
Refer to notes 127-28 supra and accompanying text.
153.
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1994); see also Safe Harbor, supra note 127, at 45, 675-78
154.
(explaining limitations on FTC jurisdiction in these areas).
See Directive 951461EC, supra note 2, at art. 4. In fact, the translation of this
155.
provision creates a more liberal rule of jurisdiction in some countries where the term
"means," rather than "equipment," is used. See REIDENBERG & SCHWARTZ, supra note 88,
at 127-28.
See, e.g., UEJF c. Yahoo!, TGI de Paris, Ord. en r~fdrd du 22 Nov. 2000; Joel R.
156.
Reidenberg, L'affaire Yahoo et la democratization internationale de l'Internet, Communic
Juris Classeur. Commerce 6lectronique, chron. 12 (May 2001).
Privacy on the Internet-An Integrated EU Approach to Online Data
157.
Protection: Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing
of Personal Data, DG XV COM (00)5063 final at 28 (noting the application of the
substantive law of a Member State under Article 4 of the Directive in the context of
cookies on hard drives in a Member State), http://europa.eu.int/comm/internalmarketlen/
media/dataprotvpdocswp37en.pdf.
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"adequate" basis to transfer personal information to the United
States implicitly acknowledges that transfers outside the scope of
Safe Harbor will not be adequately protected. Consequently, nonSafe Harbor transfers must be covered by one of the other
exceptions to the transborder data flow rules, such as a transfer
pursuant to a contractual arrangement.5 8
Ironically, Safe Harbor simplifies the task for national
supervisory authorities to block data flows to the United States.
The national agencies will readily be able to identify those U.S.
companies that do not subscribe to Safe Harbor and have not
presented a data protection contract for approval under the
European Directive's Article 26 exceptions. In such cases, the
presumption must be that the protection is "inadequate" and the
data-flow must, under European law, be prohibited.'5 9
Thus, for the United States Safe Harbor approach might
compromise many U.S. businesses in a way that a legislative
solution would not. For e-commerce, this risk is devastating.
C. Weakening of EuropeanStandardsand Illusory
Enforcement Mechanisms
For the national supervisory authorities in Europe, Safe
Harbor poses a weakening of European standards. 6 ' In particular,
the permissible derogations from Safe Harbor without a loss of
coverage are significant. Safe Harbor exempts public record
" '
information despite its ordinary protection under European law.16
Similarly, Safe Harbor exempts any processing pursuant to
"conflicting obligations" or "explicit authorizations" in U.S. law,
whether or not such processing would be permissible under
European standards. 6 ' The access standard set out in Safe Harbor
also includes derogations that do not exist in European law.'6'
Most importantly, however, Safe Harbor weakens European
standards for redress of data privacy violations. Under the

158. Directive 95/461EC, supra note 2, at art. 26. The European Commission has
issued a model contract for this purpose. See http'J/europa.eu.int/comm/internalmarket
en/media/dataprotnews/clauses.htm (last visited July 14, 2001).
159. See Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 2, at art. 25.
160. Opinion of the Working Party, supra note 134 (noting the watering down of the
Directive's standards under Safe Harbor due to exceptions for obligations under U.S. law,
publicly available data, and other such loopholes, and recommending close monitoring of
exception usage).
161. Compare Safe Harbor, supra note 127, at FAQ 8(7)-(8) (defining exemptions for
publicly available data), with Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 2, at art. 2(a) (containing no
exemption for such data).
162. See Safe Harbor, supra note 127, at 45, 667.
163. See generally id.
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European Directive, victims must be able to seek legal recourse
and have a damage remedy." The U.S. Department of Commerce
assured the European Commission that Safe Harbor and the U.S.
legal system provided remedies for individual European victims
of Safe Harbor violations.1 65 The European Commission expressly
relied on representations made by the U.S. Department of
Commerce concerning available damages in American law. 66 The
memorandum presented by the U.S. Department of Commerce to
the European Commission, however, made misleading
statements of U.S. law.'67 For example, the memorandum
provides a lengthy discussion of the privacy torts and indicates
that the torts would be available.'68 The memorandum failed to
note that the applicability of these tort actions to data processing
and information privacy has never been established by U.S.
courts and is, at present, purely theoretical. Indeed, the
memorandum cites the tort for misappropriation of a name or
likeness as a viable damage remedy, but all three of the state
courts that have addressed this tort in the context of data privacy
have rejected it.' 69 Safe Harbor is also predicated on dispute
resolution through seal organizations such as TRUSTe.170 Yet,
only one seal organization, the ESRB, proposes any direct
remedy to the victim of a breach of a privacy policy, and other
organizations' membership lists look like a "Who's Who" of
privacy scandal-plagued companies. 7 '
Lastly, the enforcement provisions of Safe Harbor rely on the
FTC.172 Even if the FTC has jurisdiction to enforce Safe Harbor,
the assertion that the FTC will give priority to European
enforcement actions is hard to believe. First, although the FTC
M

164.
Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 2, at arts. 22-23.
165.
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, DAMAGES FOR BREACHES OF PRIVACY, LEGAL
AUTHORIZATIONS AND MERGERS AND TAKEOVERS IN U.S. LAW (July 14, 2000)
[hereinafter BREACHES OF PRIVACY], available at http://www.ita.gov/td/ecom/
PRIVACYDAMAGESFINAL.htm.
166.
Commission Decision 00/520/EC, art. 1(b), 2000 O.J. (L 215) 7, 8 (listing the
memorandum as one of four documents the European Commission considered in
determining Safe Harbor's adequacy).
167.
BREACHES OF PRIVACY, supra note 165.
168. Id.
169. See Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1995) (rejecting
claim of breach of privacy against credit card company for renting information of
cardholder's spending habits); Shibley v. Time, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975)
(discussing magazine subscription lists); U.S. News & World Report, Inc. v. Avrahami,
No. 95-1318, 1996 WL 1065557 (Va. Cir. Ct. June 13, 1996) (stating the proposition that
names do not have property value in the context of magazine subscription lists).
170.
Safe Harbor, supranote 127, at 45,665-685.
171.
Refer to Part I.C. supra.
172.
Safe Harbor, supra note 127, at 45,668.
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has become active in privacy issues recently, the agency's record
of enforcing the Fair Credit Reporting Act, one of the country's
most important fair information practices statutes, is less than
aggressive. Second, were the FTC to devote its limited resources
to the protection of Europeans' privacy, Americans should and
would be offended that a U.S. government agency-charged with
protecting American consumers-chose to commit its energies
and U.S. taxpayer money to the protection of European privacy
in the United States against U.S. businesses at a higher level
than the FTC asserts for the protection of Americans' privacy.
Sadly, though, for many American companies even these
weakened European standards impose substantially greater
obligations than U.S. law. In particular, the notice, choice,
access, and correction requirements are only sporadically found
in U.S. law. As a result, pitifully few American companies have
subscribed to Safe Harbor; indeed, as of June 21, 2001, fewer
than fifty-five companies had signed up.'73
The upshot of these sui generis standards, the
unenthusiastic reception by American companies, and
enforcement weaknesses is a likelihood that the national
supervisory agencies will be dissatisfied with Safe Harbor and
the Member States will face great political pressure to suspend
Safe Harbor once transposition is completed. Thus, for ecommerce, the utility of Safe Harbor is rather dubious.
IV. AN INTERNATIONAL TREATY SOLUTION

With the trans-Atlantic divide on privacy so deeply
entrenched, the United States is on the path to rapidly becoming
the world's leading privacy rogue nation. Just a cursory
examination of the data scandals over the last year and
consumer privacy concerns for e-commerce suggest that our
national policy of self-regulation will not work to assure public
confidence and trust in the treatment of personal information,
cannot work to guarantee citizens their political right to freedom
of association and privacy, and will leave American businesses at
a competitive disadvantage in the global information market
place. At a time when Internet growth rates are greater outside
the United States, and non-U.S. Web content is becoming an
absolute majority of available Internet content, 74 United States
173.

U.S.

DEP'T OF COMIERCE, SAFE HARBOR LIST (reflecting only fifty-five

subscribing company certifications), at http://web.ita.doc.gov/safeharbor/shlist.nsf/
webPages/safe+harbor+list (last visited July 13, 2001).
174. See, e.g., 55 Percent of All Web Traffic Worldwide Comes from Outside the
United States, STAT MARKET, http://statmarket.com/SM?c=statO12301 (Jan. 23, 2001).
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interests are ill-served by avoiding the creation of clear legal
privacy rights.
The United States desperately needs to establish a basic set
of legal protections for privacy. Any such regulation must
recognize that technologies will be essential to ensure privacy
protections across divergent sets of rules in the global
environment. In fact, technical decisions are not policy neutral.
Technical decisions make privacy rules, and more often than not
in the United States, these rules are privacy invasive. For
technology to provide effective privacy protection, three
conditions must be met: (1) technology respecting fair
information practices must exist; (2) these technologies must be
deployed; and (3) the implementation of these technologies must
have a privacy protecting default configuration. Legal rights in
the United States should provide an incentive structure that
encourages these developments.
But new legal rights and technological protections in the
United States will not be sufficient to resolve the trans-Atlantic
privacy conflicts on a long-term basis. Any legal rights created in
the United States will be defined in terms of the U.S. governance
system-including the American delineations among state,
citizen, and market power. As a result, such rights will always
have a degree of variance with foreign laws that are set within
their own governance systems. For global e-commerce, even
small differences can have dramatic consequences.1 75 When
differences are entrenched in national values for the governance
of a society, only international law will be able to resolve the
structural conflicts. Treaties are the inevitable legal instruments
that enable nation-state policies to develop in harmony.
In conjunction with the establishment of a legal baseline in
the United States, the United States should promote the
negotiation of a "General Agreement on Information Privacy"
(GAIP) within the World Trade Organization framework.'76 This
treaty organization's mission covers e-commerce and can be used
to facilitate the protection of citizens within the transborder data
flows. Whether or not desired by various interest groups and
countries, the WTO will be unable to avoid confronting
international privacy issues as a result of the biennial ministerial
conferences and the inevitable trade-in-services agenda. Many of

175. See, e.g., REIDENBERG & SCHWARTZ, supra note 87, at 143-44 (discussing the
distorting effects for online services of small divergences in national data protection law
within Europe).
176. See Reidenberg, supra note 3, 1359-62 (advocating an international treaty on
data privacy in the WTO framework instead of an international directorate).
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the core differences among nations on the implementation of
privacy principles touch upon fundamental governance and
sovereignty questions.177 These types of problems will only be
resolved at an international treaty level like the WTO.
At this level, the WTO can define core standards for data
protection. The WTO parties had a first experience with this
standards-based approach to international trade law when
intellectual property was added to the multilateral trade accord
as a result of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. 178 The
intellectual property agreement sets out the substantive
standards for the protection of intellectual property each
signatory must incorporate in its domestic law. 7 Once
implemented, each signatory must abide by strict trade rules
that recognize the protections afforded by the other signatories. 8
Similarly, the WTO could strive to establish a set of basic data
protection standards-the GAIP-and incorporate them into the
multilateral trade agreement. The incorporation of GAIP into the
WTO and national law would then provide for mutual recognition
of signatories' data privacy rules. This approach would have a
higher likelihood of successfully facilitating e-commerce than any
uniquely national or bilateral approach.
V.

CONCLUSION

E-commerce poses tremendous challenges to the fair
treatment of personal information in the United States, in
Europe, and around the world. At present, the trans-Atlantic
relationship for privacy is on a collision course. For all the
problems found in U.S. data privacy, Europe cannot lay claim to
the only possible system of protection for personal information,
and the export restrictions found in European law will
necessitate the ban of transborder data flows for a variety of ecommerce activities. The attempt to create an ad hoc "safe
harbor" for transatlantic data flows, while laudable, falls far
short of its goal. The legality of such an approach is dubious, the
political commitment faces obstacles, and the commercial
environment will be inhospitable for those American companies
who might offer better protection to foreign-origin data than to

177. Id.
178.
See generally Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
(1994) (including the TRIPs annex on intellectual property.)
179. Id. at 358-59.
180. Id. at 359-60.
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American-origin data. A new international data privacy treaty
will be essential for the long-term, robust growth of e-commerce.
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